The Overlooked Complexity of Iran-GCC Relations

With geopolitical tensions escalating in the Middle East, many experts have begun analyzing the relations between various actors involved in the region’s major conflicts, especially in Syria and Iraq. One of the actors that have been mentioned and analyzed extensively is a group commonly known in the west as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC is comprised of six Arab countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

This group has become important, given the escalation of the Syrian conflict and the worsening of already strained Iranian-Saudi relations. Some experts have gone as far as recommending policies for the Obama administration and have suggested ways to repair the U.S.’s damaged relations with the GCC. These recommendations revolve around two main policies: Increasing support for anti-Assad forces and containing Iran’s growing influence in the region. What these experts have overlooked, however, are the major differences that GCC members have, especially in regards to Iran. While countries such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have been confrontational other GCC countries have in recent years refrained from undertaking the same strategy.

The Friend

The most distinct example of a GCC country with friendly relations with Iran is Oman. Muscat’s close relations with Tehran go back to Iran’s pre-Islamic revolution era. The two countries have maintained these relations for decades despite complex circumstances in the Region.

Oman is one of Iran’s closest friends in the region, and it has also shown itself as a trustworthy one. Oman was the country that hosted the secret negotiations between Iran and the U.S. These negotiations set the stage for a series of Iran-P5+1 negotiations that led to the historic Iran nuclear deal. In this case, by maintaining the secrecy of these delicate negotiations, Oman showed itself as a reliable partner for Iran. Oman’s Sultan Qaboos was also the first foreign leader that visited Iran after the victory of Hassan Rouhani in the Iranian presidential election. Unsurprisingly, Oman was the first Arab state that Rouhani visited as president.

The Neutrals

Many think that Qatar and the UAE have been consistent on publicly labeling Iran as a regional threat. However, unlike the Saudis, these two Arab countries have used rather soft and balanced tones for criticizing or confronting Iran. For instance, it is true that Qatar has supported the overthrow of Iranian-backed Bashar Al-Assad in Syria, the primary reason behind Saudi-Iranian tensions, but it has also supported constructive dialogs with Tehran. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly in September, 2015, Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani “offered to host a ‘meaningful dialogue’ in an attempt to calm Arab-Iranian differences […].” He also added that “[Qatar’s] relations with Iran were ‘growing and evolving steadily’.” Such positive remarks are drastically different from the rhetoric coming out of Riyadh.

Akin to Qatar, the UAE has also tried to maintain a balanced strategy while dealing with Iran. This balanced approach has included full-scale military campaigns against parties backed by Iran. In Bahrain, where anti-government demonstrations were led by Iranian-supported Shiite clerics, the Emiratis sent 500 police forces to assist the Bahraini government with the crackdowns. They also sent troops to Yemen for the fight against the Houthis, a group that has been supported by Tehran.

Nonetheless, the UAE has been cautious about dealing with Iran on other matters such as the Iran nuclear deal. A report in October, 2015 indicated that the UAE does not consider itself abound to the 123 Agreement. In the 123 Agreement signed in 2009 between the UAE and the U.S., the Arab country pledged not to pursue uranium enrichment capabilities. In response to this report, “the UAE embassy in Washington said the government has not formally changed its views or perspective on the 123 Agreement or commitments.” The UAE has also welcomed the nuclear deal reached between Iran and the world powers and has not been outspoken, unlike Saudi Arabia, in criticizing Iran. This is primarily due to its economic ties with Iran.

The UAE remains, by far, Iran’s biggest non-oil goods trading partner within the GCC states. In 2013, about $100 billion dirhams (US$27 billion) worth of non-oil goods was exported from the UAE to Iran. This makes Iran an important trading partner for the UAE. Moreover, the IMF has forecasted that the end of Iran’s nuclear sanctions can result in a US$13 billion gain for the UAE economy. With such significant economic relations, the UAE is expected to continue with its balanced policy vis-à-vis Iran.

The Rivals

Two GCC countries, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, stand out as rivals to Iran. The tensions between Bahrain and Iran are not new. Iran and Bahrain have, at many times, used confrontational tones towards one another. This has been mainly due to Bahrain’s Shia Muslims who comprise 70% of the country’s population.

Since the beginning of the uprisings in 2011, the Sunni rulers of Bahrain have considered Iran as the main supporter of the Shia leaders of these protests, further souring relations between the two countries. Both, thus far, have shown no willingness to work towards reconciliation, and tensions are still escalating. On October 1st, 2015, Bahrain recalled its ambassador from Iran and expelled the Iranian envoy to Bahrain. About a month later, on November 5th, 2015, Bahrain detained 47 people, accusing them of being part of an Iranian-backed terrorist plot. It also, on the same day, sentenced five individuals to life imprisonment for working with Iran to carry out attacks in Bahrain.

As the Iranian-Bahraini relations deteriorate sharply, the Iranian-Saudi relations have also worsened — both of these Arab states appear to be following the same path for dealing with Iran. This is due to the disagreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia over the future of Bashar Al-Assad as part of Syria’s post-civil war government. Saudi Arabia remains inflexible over its policy of supporting a Syria without Assad — a policy in direct opposition to Iran’s interests.

Saudi Arabia continues to maintain its current level of oil production, putting downward pressure on oil prices. The falling oil prices are costly for Iran, as the sanctions-hit country will need its oil revenues after the nuclear deal is implemented. The Saudi government’s policy has also put significant pressure on the country’s own budget. In spite of this, there is no sign of a shift in the Saudi policy for the foreseeable future.

The GCC: A Complex Group

The GCC have members with varying interests, and this is especially true when these Arab states deal with Iran. Each GCC member country has economic and geo-political interests that greatly differ from the interests of other members. When analyzing Iran-GCC relations, experts need to recognize this fact and understand how internal dynamics of the GCC can affect their policies.

 
Kei Zamaninoor

Kei Zamaninoor is currently a Master of Global Affairs (MGA) Candidate at Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto. He previously studied Business Administration at Schulich School of Business, York University. His research interests include international business, international economy, Middle Eastern geopolitics, and Iranian affairs.

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