Troubled Waters in the South China Sea

While global observers of the recently concluded Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in San Francisco speculated on what it meant for the trajectory of US-China relations, few noticed a brewing storm between two of the summit’s participants – Chinese President Xi Jinping and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. Their meeting on November 17 came after another round of escalating tensions in the South China Sea that began in August. Since then, the Philippines have accused China of engaging in dangerous and offensive behaviour towards its vessels, such as firing water cannons and deliberately colliding with them. China meanwhile accused the Philippines of disrupting the regional peace and urged them to stop “violating China’s territorial sovereignty”. With these incidents in mind, Marcos met with Xi to discuss ways to reduce tensions and to restore Filipino access to fishing grounds. They agreed that “geopolitical problems should not be the defining element of the two countries’ relationship”, with Marcos adding that nobody wants war. A couple of days later, though, Marcos insisted at a forum in Hawaii that the Philippines will not “give up a single inch of [its] territory to any foreign power” and that it will “insist on the preservation of the sovereignty and integrity of the country”. He said that the situation in the South China Sea has not improved and “has become more dire than it was before”, and that China had shown interest in atolls and shoals closer to the Philippine coast. This suggests that the meeting with Xi did not represent any cooling down of an already tense relationship, and the Philippines feels increasingly threatened by Chinese activities in the region.

            Disputes over the South China Sea, in which both China and the Philippines are claimant states, extend beyond their bilateral arguments. Apart from them, various portions of the South China Sea are also claimed by Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan, who mirrors Chinese claims. However, China fiercely defends its maritime claims demarcated by the infamous “nine-dash-line” which extends far out from Hainan Province into the South China Sea, amounting to 90% of the entire area. Such sweeping claims have practically united the Southeast Asian countries, whose Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) are encompassed by the nine-dash line. The Philippines took China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague to challenge its claims under the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), where the court ruled in the Philippines’ favour in 2016. China boycotted the arbitration and declared its rejection of the ruling. The South China Sea remains hotly contested by the claimants ever since.

            That does not mean that there were no efforts to move towards an agreement. As recently as July, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China agreed on guidelines to accelerate negotiations for a code of conduct in the South China Sea, which would aid in resolving disputes. However, it appears to have made little headway, especially amidst the most recent round of escalations between the Philippines and China. Furthermore, while confrontations between Philippine and Chinese maritime forces have never completely stopped, it is not entirely sure what prompted the flaring up of tensions in August. While the two clashed during a Philippine resupply mission to the deliberately grounded BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal, China had long protested the Philippine presence there and demanded that the Sierra Madre be removed. Some suggest that China is waiting for the vessel, grounded since 1999, to crumble from wear and tear. Resupply missions to the Sierra Madre would prolong China’s wait. Regardless, the Philippines has vowed to continue these resupply missions, and have stepped up its defence posturing. For instance, it conducted a joint sail with the United States in September through parts of the South China Sea within its EEZ, and in early November announced the launching of five coast guard vessels with Japanese aid.

            In latest developments, the Philippines launched another round of joint patrols with the United States, including both sea and air forces, within the South China Sea, further displaying its resolve to stand up against Chinese interference. In view of slow negotiation progress between ASEAN and China, the Philippines has reached out to its Southeast Asian neighbours too. Marcos stated that the Philippines has approached Malaysia and Vietnam to discuss a separate code of conduct in the area, further hoping that the initiative would “grow further and extend to other ASEAN countries”. While China, Malaysia, and Vietnam have not commented on the matter, China would most likely reject any arrangement that excludes it from discussions. This may, however, also represent the increasingly urgent nature of the South China Sea disputes. If ASEAN-China negotiations continue to stall, more countries may be incentivised to seek alternative arrangements to settle maritime disputes or even security guarantees. The former means a more united Southeast Asian bloc against China, while the latter suggests deeper American involvement. Neither option is favourable to Chinese interests.

Wu Yang

Wu Yang is a first-year student in the Master of Global Affairs program at the Munk School. He received his Bachelor of Arts from the University of Toronto, majoring in Political Science and International Relations, and minoring in History. He has a keen interest in the development of political ideas as well as foreign policy, particularly with a regional focus on East and Southeast Asia.

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