Biden and the North Korean nuclear crisis: Engagement or maximum pressure?

Before President Trump took office in 2017, President Obama warned the incoming administration that North Korea was the United States’ most pressing national security threat. Fast forward four years, and the North Korean nuclear problem remains. With the upcoming inauguration of U.S. president-elect Joe Biden, one must ask: how will the new Biden administration handle the North Korean nuclear crisis? Can we expect Biden to depart from Trump’s “summit diplomacy” approach, which emphasized a personal relationship between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, or will Biden prefer a strategy similar to Obama’s “strategic patience”  policy? 

Given that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have only grown stronger since Obama’s presidency, it is unlikely Biden will revert to Obama’s approach of strategically engaging with North Korea. It is equally unlikely that Biden will pursue the same strategy as Trump, whose presidency saw the worst tensions between North Korea and the United States in decades.  

In 2017, North Korea and the United States were almost driven to the brink of war. After North Korea tested its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the western United States, Trump vowed to destroy North Korea with “fire and fury” if necessary. Following months of threats and reports that the United States considered a pre-emptive, “bloody nose” strike on North Korea, but by 2018 there was a dramatic departure from the high tensions of the previous year. 

Largely due to the diplomatic overtures of South Korea’s Moon Jae-in administration, President Trump and Kim Jong-un met for high-level denuclearization negotiations in Singapore in June 2018. Despite Trump’s claim that North Korea was no longer a nuclear threat, the negotiations were largely a failure as they lacked any substantive agreements. More specifically, North Korea insisted that certain international sanctions be lifted before it would agree to key denuclearization steps. After a second meeting between Kim and Trump in February 2019, negotiations between North Korea and the United States collapsed. If the Biden administration wants to avoid a repeat of this failure, it must carefully consider its strategy towards North Korea. 

In a recent op-ed for the South Korean newspaper Yonhap, Biden declared his support for the full denuclearization of North Korea and the unification of the Korean peninsula. He further specified his plans to pursue a strategy of “principled diplomacy” towards North Korea. Biden even expressed his willingness to meet with Kim Jong-un. Unlike Trump, however, Biden will require the North Koreans to meet certain pre-conditions, such as low-level diplomatic talks, before a meeting can take place. At least for the moment, it appears Biden is planning a strategy that combines elements from the previous two administrations. 

As Biden continues to develop his strategy towards North Korea, it must be informed by a deep assessment of the constantly evolving political environment, specifically how North Korea will welcome the new Biden administration. There is reason to believe that Biden’s presidency will be less favourable to the North Koreans, who benefitted from Trump’s personal relationship with Kim Jong-un. In the past, North Korea has made their opinion of the president-elect quite clear, once referring to Biden as a “rabid dog” that “should be beaten to death.” 

Since the U.S. election, Kim has been one of the few world leaders yet to publicly acknowledge Biden’s win. Regardless, it is evident that North Korea has no intentions of giving up its nuclear weapons in the near future. On October 10, 2020, North Korea revealed its biggest ICBM to date during celebrations for the 75th anniversary of the Korean Workers’ Party. Although the efficacy of the weapon is subject to speculation, North Korea sent a clear message to the world: not only have the negotiations with the Trump administration failed, but North Korea will continue to use its nuclear weapons as a deterrent against outside attacks.

This leaves the Biden administration in a precarious position. If Biden wishes to avoid the failures of past administrations’ dealings with North Korea, it must first accept that North Korea will not surrender its nuclear weapons. In other words, the new administration should abandon any hopes for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) of North Korea in the short term. 

Although consistent engagement with North Korea remains key, the Biden administration should firmly condemn any future North Korean provocations. It is also imperative that the Biden administration reaffirm the strategic importance of the alliance between the U.S. and South Korea. This will require repairing the damage the strategic relationship suffered under President Trump, largely due to disagreements over cost-sharing negotiations for U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. 

Finally, Biden could potentially shift his focus towards the humanitarian situation in North Korea, which has worsened as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic  and recent monsoon flooding. Although the complete denuclearization of North Korea is not feasible in the near future, the Biden administration has the opportunity to reshape the North Korean nuclear crisis and provide a strong foundation for eventual peace on the Korean peninsula.